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In this chapter I want to look at computer-mediated consumer purchase contracts. 
These are contracts made in the world of e-commerce using websites such as Amazon 
which exist only as electronic presences and the online presences of conventional 
“bricks  and  mortar”  retail  establishments. In 2011 the value of retail online sales in 
the UK was £50.34 billion representing 12.0% of UK retail trade. In 2008 the 
equivalent figure was 8.6% of retail sales. In the US the market share of online sales 
is 9.0% (CCR 2011). In Australia and New Zealand the figure is rather lower at just 
under 7% but is predicated, like the UK, the US and Europe to carry on growing 
(Frost and Sullivan 2012). The growth of online shopping, previously fuelled by the 
increase in domestic broadband accessibility, now unsurprisingly mirrors the 
popularity in ownership of mobile devices that can access the internet; in the UK just 
over a quarter of adults own a smartphone, in the US that figure rises to over a third 
(Ofcom 2011; Pew Research Centre 2011). Continuing online retail sales growth in a 
period of general contraction for retail sales because of world wide economic 
conditions emphasizes the entrenchment of online shopping as a cultural practice. The 
particular example for this paper comes from a study of contracts made using eBay, 
which is a marketplace site that acts as an intermediary rather than as a retailer in its 
own right. As the paper points out contracts made using this marketplace differ from 
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contracts made using online presences of conventional retail establishments or 
internet sites such as Amazon in that trust has to be established not in a brand name 
for goods or in a retail establishment but in an unknown individual. 
A discrete contract is a contract made without social relations Macneil tells us, 
and yet he also suggests that all contracts are relational in they are embedded in some 
social relations, however minimal. Even the most  discrete  contract  on  Macneil’s 
 terms  is encircled by an understanding about how an exchange will be facilitated 
(Macneil 
1986:577; 1987a: 32) a concept which he understandably draws very widely (Macneil 
 
1974a:724) expanding outwards from his four core elements; order, means of 
enforcement, means of exchange and communication (Macneil 1999-2000:834). We 
might deduce from this that the discrete contract is something that is impossible to 
achieve and that all contracts are relational with some just being less relational than 
others.  However I would assert that Macneil in much of his work is using 
terminology that does not belong to the language family that is recognized by lawyers 
and this results in readings of his position that are not in strict accordance with what 
he meant.  Later  in  this  chapter  I  try  to  unpick  Macneil’s  apparently 
 contradictory  comments on the relational-discrete distinction. This discussion is 
important for the accommodation of these computer-mediated contracts  within 
 Macneil’s  framework. 
Computer-mediated contracts offer a very different form of social relations from 
those observed by Macneil, even if all due recognition is given to his observation that 
contract is a field of huge breadth when he opines that the contractual relations of 
IBM  and  a  McDonald’s  hamburger  franchise  are  very  different  (Macneil  1980:20). 
 In order to place these contracts within a Macneilian framework it necessary to see  
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his work, particularly at the micro level of his contract norms, as being rooted very 
much in a particular understanding of industrial society and reason forwards from that 
point. Macneil uses contract in a macro sense to progress society from primitive to 
advanced and in doing so he anchors his micro level analysis of the behavioural 
dimension of contract to a reading of industrial society that is very orientated towards a 
particular understanding of production and employment relations (Macneil 1985). The 
effect of this is that behavior that Macneil might have characterized as discrete and as 
such on the edge of society now in fact represents behavior that is much closer to the 
centre ground of social relations. This is explored in the second section of the paper. In 
this way the  chapter  builds  on  Macneil’s  position  in  relation  to  the  discrete norm 
(Macneil 
1983:355f) and offers a contribution to the debate around whether a purely discrete 
contract is ever possible. My conclusion on this point is that Macneil fails to 
distinguish between the social processes involved with making a contract and the 
informational relationships that underpin strategic choices that are made in the 
contractual interaction. If these two are separated then a more nuanced and descriptive 
meaning  can  be  given  to  the  notion  of  “discrete”  in  the  world  of  contract.  I 
explore what this might look like in the third section of the paper. 
The analysis that I offer in this chapter sits alongside the one offered by 
Brownsword in his chapter in that from a similar starting point we offer very different 
but complimentary ways forward in  thinking  about  the  future  of  Macneil’s  model 
 of  contract. The abstracting and dehumanizing effect of technology, or the actions of 
Technical Man that might result from technology, were a concern that Macneil voiced 
in the closing ten pages of The New Social Contract (Macneil 1980:108-118). This 
passage is examined in some detail in Brownsword’s chapter in this collection and I 
do  not  intend  to  go  over  that  ground  again.  He  exposes  Macneil’s  concerns  as  ones 
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about control and perfection. Technical Man can organize his world so that the 
“messy  reality”  to use contract practice (Macaulay et al 2010:30) as an example need 
not be part of it. Spontaneity can be designed out of interaction and replaced instead 
by entirely bureaucratic structures that recognize  only  demands  “for  presentiation 
 and  discreteness”  (Macneil  1980:110).   Macneil’s  alternative  to  the  world  of 
 Technical  Man is the life offered in the country he calls Post-Technique. It is to the 
citizens and legislators of Post-Technique that Brownsword’s  largely regulatory 
solution in 
support of a New Social Contract is addressed. It focuses on the control of technology 
to support self-governance in the pursuit of flexibility and autonomy but to regulate it 
where asymmetries of power emerge.  His analysis is a sophisticated one that 
considers prudential, moral and practical regulation. 
 
 
 
I-A Technological World 
 
Alongside his concerns about the disassociation of Technical Man from social 
relations we have  to  set  Macneil’s  observation also from within The New Social 
Contract about the effect of the existence of technology on contract practice and that 
is  that  its  complexity  ties  “even  the  most  specific  and  measured  exchanges  into 
 on- going  relational  patterns” (Macneil 1980:22). The technological world of 2013 
is far advanced from anything that Macneil could have thought possible in 1980 but 
the 
reality I suggest is that contracts such as these have become less not more relational as 
I explain below. The worked example that I use in this chapter to look at how 
technology has changed social relations within the contractual matrix is the purchase 
made using eBay; the transaction that can result in the most mundane of purchases but 
can also accommodate an impulse buy that stimulates excitement in the least 
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consumption focused individual. Whatever item I desire to buy – as long as it is not a 
living animal – the chances are that it will be available through a listing on eBay from 
a seller somewhere in the world and, if it is not currently listed it, it might be the next 
time I look or the time after that. In this way eBay becomes a game that can be played 
every day to quench the desire for consumption activity (Molesworth and Denegri- 
Knott 2008). I will not know exactly where in the world beyond the particular nation 
state my object is located and I will know nothing about the seller other than the other 
items they are offering for sale. I want to suggest that we see different configurations 
of power emerging in these transactions compared with conventional consumer 
shopping scenarios (Rha and Widdows 2002) and that power is maintained and 
advanced through artificially constructed devices such as feedback systems, the 
contents of which are entirely the product of social relations. These are the new 
communications  systems  that  have  replaced  any  “dickering  over  terms”  or 
 perhaps, more appropriately to a consumer contract scenario, any face to face 
inquiries about colour choices, delivery times and the possibility of seasonal sale 
discounts (Licklider and Taylor 1968) 
Advances in technology in general and in the functionality of the internet in 
particular when it was opened to commercial applications in the early 1990s (Abbate 
1999; Wu 2010:168-175,262-268) have had a transformative effect on human 
existence. Broadband technology and telecommunications innovation have resulted in 
the more precise articulation of, what I term, vertical relationships between individual 
qua citizen and state and between citizen and corporation. In general terms we can see 
that it has enhanced the democratic process, both formal and informal (Coursey and 
Norris 2008; Van Laer 2010) and improved the targeting and delivery of some public 
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services (UN 2008). It is a significant factor in increasing economic development 
(Czernich et al 2011), even though we can drill below these generalities into the 
persistence of the digital divide and the inequalities that are created and exacerbated 
by that (Eubanks 2011: 35-48). It is also the case that the internet has created the 
opportunity for some relationships which are potentially very unequal and require 
power imbalances to be addressed in form of human rights protection and other 
regulatory controls if these relationships are not to be abusive. Although Brownsword 
does not articulate these instances specifically in his account of necessary regulatory 
structures, he must have in mind the potential for the state to employ surveillance and 
monitoring technology in  relation  to  individual’s  movements, the acquisition and 
retention of personal information by corporations through purchase histories and the 
use of social media and from that retention the unscrupulous targeting of unsolicited 
loans often with very high interests rates, age and content inappropriate viewing and 
gaming possibilities and consumer product marketing. Internet use renders the 
watching and monitoring of individuals inevitable and routine (Bennett 2008). 
On a more personal level it has enabled us to live our dreams through using 
cyber handles and avatars to create literally a Second Life (Denegri-Knott and 
Molesworth 2010a), to set up entirely different identities for different purposes, to 
create communities of interest that are divorced from geographical proximity 
(Williams 2006), to construct our own work life balance through working remotely 
and to embrace creativity by moving away from the linearity of thought imposed by 
traditional structures. However just as with the relationships that I term vertical this 
transformative effect on the individual is not always positive.  The employment 
opportunities it has created outside of design and invention work are the new satanic 
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mills of call centres and data entry nodes, acknowledged to offer low job satisfaction 
(Ellis and Taylor 2006), or the factories located in developing economies that piece 
together the actual machines that make the use of internet technology possible that 
have become as notorious as garment sweatshops for their use of child labour and 
their dangerous working conditions (Bradsher, Duhigg and Ouyang 2012). There is 
evidence that online communities are created at the expense of maintaining existing 
relationships that depend on telephone use and direct personal contact (Kraut et al 
1998; Wellman, Boase and Chen 2002). Unsurprisingly the literature on technology 
captures these paradoxes and divides itself between laudation and damnation (Mick 
and Fournier 1998). 
In horizontal relationships, specifically in the world of contract, technology has 
rendered the previously reasonably social practice of shopping (Bowlby 1997: 102- 
104) whether that is task fulfillment shopping or recreational shopping (Wagner and 
Rudolf 2010) a potentially more solitary exercise; access to credit and an internet 
connection means one is able to enter into a wide range of transactions without 
engaging in communication beyond the use of a point, click and buy interface. The 
sensory stimulation offered by the freedom of the physical space of shopping centres 
and browsing opportunities is replaced by surfing the virtual world of the web (Cox, 
Cox and Anderson 2005). The impulse to buy in both cases may come from similar 
sources such as advertising and window-shopping represented in the world of the 
internet by website design and interactive functions (sometimes referred to as the 
“stickiness”  of  a  website  (Miller  2000))  and ultimately by the aesthetic power of 
the screen (Zwick and Dholakia 2006) and the desire to buy with its concomitant 
feelings 
of escape and otherness is the same in both contexts but one involves human contact 
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and the other involves social relations mediated through virtual space (Belk, Ger, 
Askegaard 2003). The purchase made across virtual space is not necessarily more 
rational, reasoned or needs orientated than a purchase made in a conventional retail 
store simply because it can be concluded more quickly. However the internet offers 
the opportunity for the purchase to be more informed and selected from a wider range 
of possible purchases. Consumers can access a global market, gather information on 
price and quality variance and potentially connect with other consumers who have 
made or are considering a similar purchase from the same range of potential sellers. 
This reverses the power imbalance that conventionally is said to exist between buyer 
and seller in favour of the buyer (Pires, Stanton and Rita 2006).  As section 3 of the 
paper explains buyers using the eBay platform draw on this power imbalance to make 
their purchases and enhance it through participating in the eBay feedback system. 
What binds applications of technology together at the level of the individual is 
the idea of interactivity – filling in a self-assessment tax return and applying for a loan 
from a bank are interactive processes. They are about functionality, speed of 
communication and the relatedness of sequential messages (Rafaeli and Ariel 2007). 
As I explain below interactive processes look like relatively discrete social relations 
in  Macneil’s  terms  and  involve  no  more by way of complex social relations (cf 
Walther 1992) than the potentially coercive vertical relationships outlined above. To 
discover social relations in internet transactions we have to dig beyond the level of 
mere interactivity (Downes and McMillan 2000) limited to a clicked decline or accept 
to discover a deeper information flow (Rezabakhsh et al 2006). 
Most days when I return from work and certainly at the weekends I peruse 
 
eBay, in the compulsive fashion described by fiction writer and icon William Gibson 
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(Gibson 1999), for any new listings and price changes in the form of bids in the 
categories that I follow because I am an addicted collector, in a taxonomic sense as 
opposed to an aesthetic sense (Belk 1991), of diverse and obscure things that include, 
as I explain below, Beswick china Beatrix Potter character figures. I use eBay for 
purchasing everyday household items but the account of eBay trading in this paper is 
all about sourcing  the  “special”  (to  me)  item;; hoping intently that the missing 
piece is there and at a price I can I afford, choosing the seller, bidding for rather than 
simply buying the item and then securing the item through submitting the bid that 
beats all competitors in the time period the proxy auction allows, all the while hoping 
that I do not then see a better example of the piece in question on another day. In this 
way eBay becomes something of an emotional drama which I play through nearly 
everyday (Denegri Knott and Molesworth 2010b). I am not alone in my daily visits to 
eBay; the calendar year to September 2012 saw 108.3 millon active users bid for, list, 
buy or sell on eBay.
i
 
The internet and eBay in particular has empowered me and thousands of 
 
taxonomic collectors like me to scour the world in pursuit of the objects that I desire. 
The fastest growing categories of items for sale on eBay have been listings for 
collectibles such as stamps and medals (Bradley and Porter 2000). The steps 
necessary to become a successful collector are truncated and rendered simpler by the 
internet auction sites like eBay. Planning what to collect (goal formation), hunting for 
the objects to collect and garnering a knowledge base about the objects themselves in 
terms of their scarcity and distinguishing marks is made much easier by the image 
rich internet (Ellis and Haywood 2006). Ebay listings contain descriptions and 
 
photographs of items. Old auction catalogues, magazines and collectors guides are 
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available in different eBay listings or from sites such as Amazon. Ebay hosts 
 
collection pages for those who want a quick overview of particular items. However all 
the exhilaration and excitement of the planning phase (Formanek 1991) as which 
object to be pursued is decided upon and then courted through bidding is still there. 
Actual ownership in the form of handling the object and placing it on the shelfspace 
allotted to it within the collection can be imagined as the clock ticks down to zero on 
the listing (Olmsted 1991; McCracken 1988:110f). 
It is possible to become a connoisseur of a particular field, an expert in 
identifying the item that makes enhances a collection much more quickly and with 
less effort than would have been the case previously (McIntosh and Schmeichel 
2004). The  internet  accommodates  Belk’s  four  types  of collector; the passionate 
collector who collects obsessively as a matter of desire, the hobby collector, the 
investor  collector  and  the  “wannabe”  collector  who  collects  as  a  statement of status 
(Belk 1998) which  are  located  within  Belk’s  broader  definition of a collector as 
someone who engages in the ‘‘the  process  of  actively,  selectively,  and  passionately 
acquiring and possessing things removed from ordinary use and perceived as part of a 
set of non-identical objects or experiences’’ (Belk 1995:479).  All of these types share 
certain self-fulfilling or self-enhancing motivations, even if there is no over-arching 
psychological explanation for what makes people pursue collecting (Pearce 1992), 
that can be accommodated in more general paradigms of behavior around escape, 
entertainment and control (Case 2009). The significance of eBay in relation to 
collecting is that collecting behavior becomes about the individual and their 
introspection. 
Despite eBay’s  hosting  of  collectors  clubs, most of which have very small 
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memberships in comparison with the listings for the items they map onto, the process 
of internet collecting is a solitary activity. Buyers and sellers can find each other in a 
virtual market place without needing to meet in a physical space. There is no need to 
set up organizations to host collectors’ fairs or swap sessions. The ICDA (Interactive 
Consumer Decision Aids) technology that eBay uses means that buyer and seller are 
separated in virtual space. The buyer can make bids and having set their highest price 
(not known to the seller or other potential buyers in the same virtual space) eBay will 
act through a proxy bidding system to place bids on their behalf up to that limit 
against bids entered by other buyers. There is no face-to-face interaction involved in 
the way that there is at car boot sales, auction houses or in the traditional shopping 
scenario and in the overwhelming majority of sales there is no email contact between 
buyer and seller until after the sale is concluded if at all (Resnick and Zeckhauser 
2002). Even then contact is via an eBay user name and the parties do not know each 
other’s  legal  identities.  There is no role for pre-sale contact because eBay allows 
only very few variances in contract terms and buyer and seller reputation is created 
by the parties to previous contracts. Haggling behavior is not part of the process and 
the intensity of the purchase experience comes from acquisition  not  from  “getting  a 
 bargain” or negotiating a deal. 
 
 
 
II-Discrete and Relational Contracts 
 
The e-Bay transaction described in outline above looks to be concluded with the very 
minimum of social relations. There is no communication between the actual parties 
over and above that mediated through the eBay software which also offers access to a 
similarly mediated payment system operated by its wholly owned company, PayPal, 
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and dispute resolution system if required. We might say that what is described 
resembles the discrete transaction that Macneil describes thus:- 
Discrete contracts are characterized by short duration, limited personal 
interactions, and precise party measurements of easily measured objects 
of exchange. They require a minimum of future cooperation between the 
parties. No sharing of benefits or burdens occurs, nor is altruism expected. 
The parties are bound precisely and tightly. The parties view themselves 
as free of entangling strings (Macneil 1978:275) 
From The New Social Contract:- 
Everything about the discrete transaction is short-the agreement process, 
the time between agreement and performance, and the time of the 
performance itself. The discrete transaction commences sharply by clear, 
instantaneous agreement and terminates sharply by clear and 
instantaneous performance; sharp in, sharp out. 
 
And later in the same text:- 
 
Discreteness is the separating of a transaction from all else between the 
participants at the same time and before and after. Its ideal, never 
achieved in real life, occurs when there is nothing else between the 
parties, never has been, and never will be. (1980:11,60) 
 
It is the possibility of isolating this type of contract scenario from its more 
sophisticated counterpart – the relational contract - that is taken to be the general 
proposition  that  can  be  derived  from  Macneil’s work (Feinman 2001:59f). The 
 “gas station  on  the  Jersey  turnpike”  that  is  visited  by  someone  who  rarely 
 travels  the  road  has become a well-known shorthand for the discrete scenario 
(Macneil 1978:857) as has the horse purchase between two strangers (Macneil 
1974b:594). What is less well documented is the career long struggle that Macneil had 
to explain that this distinction alone was not what he meant by the discrete contract 
and so avoid being 
misinterpreted on this point. When Macneil used the gasoline purchase example in 
1974, in the footnotes of the article he placed the contract made at the gas station in a 
web of social relations around brand and advertising and in a network of other 
 
 
 
12 
contracts concerning the provision of credit (1974a: 720-721). He does a similar thing 
in  relation  to  supermarket  purchases;;  the  “this  for  that”  so  characteristic  of 
 depersonalized self-service shopping is not a discrete contract but instead one that is 
embedded in social relationships and a network of other contract transactions; the 
shopper and brand loyalty to product or retailer, credit transactions between shopper 
and  bank  and  the  customary  practices  of  different  supermarket  retailers  such  as 
 “taste  the difference”  and  “Tesco’s  Finest”  (1987a). There is a distinction between 
the original examples and the reworked examples that Macneil does not draw in 
discrete and relational terms and that is the distinction between the atomized process 
of 
making the contract itself and the informational and network structure that surround 
it. 
As  Feinman  explains  (Feinman  2001:63)  much  of  Macneil’s  descriptive 
 vocabulary is confusing and alien to the world in which one might expect it to have 
the most traction; contract lawyers.  Terms  such  as  “presentiation”,  “social  matrix” 
 and  “solidarity”  are  not  part  of  contract  law’s  terminological family when 
employed by a contract lawyer. This lexicon may sound more familiar to a scholar 
rooted in the disciplines of sociology or management perhaps. As a taxonomic 
collector of various objects  I  share  Macneil’s  admiration for classificatory 
structures but the presence of so many schemes and lists do nothing to elucidate his 
work. It perhaps explains the focus of his work on the social process of contracting to 
the exclusion of considering the relationships involved in social relations, the former 
being more susceptible to taxonomic structuring than the latter. To these problems 
we can add the reworking and refinements of terms that Macneil brought to his 
model all of which increase the opaqueness of his work. For example “relational”  is   
 
 
 
13 
used  interchangeably  to  contrast   with “discrete”  but  also  to refer more generally 
to contracts embedded in social relations. At one point (Macneil 1987a cf Feinman 
1990) declared that exchange relations  that  were  the  opposite  of  discrete  would 
 be  known  as  “intertwined”.  However he later lost faith in this proposition 
(Macneil 1999-2000). These examples of the way in which Macneil constructed his 
edifice of contract behavior go to the heart  of  the  confusion  that  surrounds 
 Macneil’s  message  about  the  role  he ascribes to discrete contracts in his 
worldview of contract. 
The most common approach to the question of the discrete contract is to situate 
it at the opposite end of a spectrum to relational contract. Macneil hints at the 
existence of such a spectrum (Macneil 1974a: 737) and while it is not something that 
he develops (1987b: 277f) it remains part of his thinking if only as something which 
has purely mythical force (1999-2000: 894f). The most comprehensive and 
sophisticated discussion  of  this  spectrum  idea  occurs  in  Campbell’s  work 
 (Campbell 
1996:41-43; 2001:28-31; 2013: 178-182) and, as his analysis makes clear, what 
Macneil means by this idea of a discrete to relational spectrum is not a device for 
plotting contracts by type from spot to supply say or for mapping individual contract 
scenarios but a mechanism by which we can examine contract at a macro level. This 
is the only way that statements such as:- 
Every contract ..... involves relations apart from the exchange of goods 
itself. Thus every contract is necessarily partially a relational contract, that 
is, one involving relations other than a discrete exchange (Macneil 1980: 
10) 
 
can stand alongside the following:- 
 
Discrete exchange will always be a comparatively rare phenomenon 
because it performs only the transfer of control function and is only 
minimally related to physical production of goods and services (Macneil 
1985:488) 
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and not be seen as contradictions. In the first statement Macneil is talking about 
individual contracts and contract scenarios, in the second his focus is on economic 
ordering within society at a macro level. He is using the journey from discrete to 
relational to give a sociological account of how society evolves and then works (Scott 
2013:114-115). His point is that both neo-classical economics and most expositions of 
contract doctrine  that  depend  on  the  “will”  theory  as  their  underlying  rationale 
 are  anchored incorrectly at the discrete end of the spectrum. They are represented by, 
or mirrored in, the discrete norm (Macneil 1983). If an economy was dependent on 
discrete contracts (a discrete economy, as Macneil describes it (1985:490)) as its 
primary method of facilitating exchange productivity would be very low and 
transaction costs would be very high. Contracts made via the internet using a site such 
as eBay have very low transaction costs (that is a significant part of their attraction) 
and  so  play  back  into  the  question  of  the  descriptive  force  of  the  term 
 “discrete”.     
Macneil  never  intended  that  the  label  “discrete”  should  be  appended  to 
 particular contract scenarios but rather that these interactions should be seen as 
more or less relational. This is clear from his use of marriage as an example of a 
relationship that can be more or less transactional depending presumably on the 
wishes of the parties involved and the nature of their relationship (Macneil 1987b). At 
the level of individual contract scenarios Macneil’s  concern  is  with  moving  the 
legal analysis of exchange-based relationships beyond the idea of the simple regulated 
transaction towards identifying the norms that govern such transactions when they are 
viewed as continuing relationships between the parties. Macneil’s  internal  contract 
 norms will determine how an exchange works in practice. The suggestion is that 
some 
norms will come to the fore when exchanges are more discrete, namely 
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‘implementation  of  planning’  and  ‘effectuation  of  consent’;;  while  others,  such  as 
 role  integrity and solidarity, will be more evident in exchanges that are more 
relational. Factors that  are  present  in  the  party’s relationship with each other but not 
included in the contract between them will become part of their obligation to each 
other. All ten 
of the norms that Macneil identifies will be present to some degree or another in each 
exchange.  Of these ten norms, five hold special significance with  Macneil’s  scheme. 
These are role integrity and propriety of means, which come straight from the list of 
ten, and three others, which are a combination of the remaining eight. These three are 
preservation of the relation (an expansion of contractual solidarity and flexibility), 
harmonization of relational conflict (derived from flexibility and harmonization of the 
social matrix) and the supra-contractual norm (produced from the harmonization of 
the social matrix) (Macneil 1983; Spediel 1999-2000). These will be generated in the 
relationship over time. 
 
 
 
Moving On 
 
The difficulty with these five and the longer list of ten norms, or perhaps in the 
context of the discussion here, these indicators of “relationality”, is that they do not 
map onto what has become, at one and the same time, both a more atomized and 
individual society and a more networked, particularly in the technology sense of the 
word “networked”, society in terms of social and economic life than the one Macneil 
described and fitted his norms into. Macneil’s  view  of  contract  practice  was  that  it 
 was nestled in a  society  that  was  “Macaulay-esque”  in  structure.  My  reference 
 here  is  to  Macaulay’s  classic article (Macaulay 1963) which described contractual 
practice in 
machinery manufacturing plants in Wisconsin in 1962. Macneil’s  attachment  to this 
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world is not surprising. It was the context that first confronted him when he began to 
set out his contract philosophy. Indeed one of the first articulations of his support for 
reliance-based norms reflecting the importance of conduct, trust and reliance between 
the parties as opposed to the expectation loss preference of formalist contract law 
occurs in the examination of a case concerning car manufacture in Memphis (Macneil 
1962). The empirical work of others that he relied upon moving forwards to construct 
his norms from, obviously reflected the institutional framework of business practice 
in this period and similarly so did those empirical studies that might be taken to 
 
endorse  Macneil’s  norm  identification  (Macaulay 1991; 2000). 
 
The production landscape has changed however. The buying of widgets from a 
Wisconsin component manufacturer for a car construction plant in nearby Illinois no 
longer happens. Machinery manufacturing is unlikely to exist in Wisconsin now and 
in fact had probably ceased to exist by the early 1990s. A knowledge-based economy 
with nodal production sites has replaced large scale manufacturing in developed 
economies. The dismantling of nation state based trade and investment barriers have 
made it easier for industrial production to cluster into confined geographical areas that 
offer a combination of low regulation and low cost labour and access to natural 
resources. Core and periphery of production are no longer split between developed 
and industrialised states and non-industrial developing states  (Dicken 2003:8-32). 
There are likely to be far fewer  “local”  deals  enhanced  by  personal relationships 
giving rise to concerns about reputation and creating a sort of interdependence and 
shared code of conduct between the parties. Supply chains are global. The availability 
of IT creates more transparency around product price and quality, lessening the need 
to establish communicative ties with potential trading partners and to make long term 
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contracts as the transaction costs involved in changing and replacing contractual 
partners have become lower (Sturgeon, Humphrey and Gereffi 2011). Post-sales 
service and re-order information can be automated through IT use (Lancioni, Schau 
and Smith 2003; Chryssolouris, Makris, Xanthakis and Mourtzis 2004). 
There are more contractual relationships rather than less in a world trading 
economy that is shaped in this way but they are different from the contract 
relationships that Macneil saw as typical. Webs of contracts exist around production 
but often to achieve particular goals that are not necessarily connected to the delivery 
and price of the end product. For example garment production and resource extraction 
often take place in low labour cost areas and inhospitable climates. Sub-contracts, 
supply chains and logistics firms have replaced vertical integration and, while 
Macneil did focus a great deal on horizontal arrangements, he did so with vertical 
integration and domestic level production rather than global production as the back 
drop (Macneil 1975). Sub-contracts are the preferred method of relationship not least 
because the environmental and human rights risks associated with efficient (low cost) 
production can be insulated in the chain to avoid reputational damage to brand with 
investors and end consumers (Harpur 2008; Hoang and Jones 2012 cf Vandenbergh 
2007). Global production and the world economy are driven by retail consumption 
where the brand has triumphed and blurred boundaries between manufacturers and 
retailers and their supply chain (Petrovic and Hamilton 2011). Flexibility of 
production schedules, delivery dates and contract solidarity have little role to play 
here. Relationships of trust and interdependence are still important but they are more 
likely to be expressed as partnership arrangements and co-production arrangements 
around brand identity than relationships of contract per se. 
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This relocation of production and the subsequent financialization of developed 
economies has created service based employment with contracts of employment that 
are fixed term and temporary in nature now dominate in previously industrialized 
economic areas as employers try to hedge against the vagaries of product demand and 
the need for employees with contemporary skills. Or at least this is the perception of 
those who are contracting for employment (Tweedie 2013) and in the context of 
mapping  “relationality”  it  is  perception  that  is  all-important as contract 
relationships are embedded in social relations, as those relations are experienced.  It is 
not unusual for several part-time employment positions to be held at once in low-
level employment with poor job satisfaction (Kalleberg 2011). Long-term 
employment 
with a single provider has been replaced by portfolio careers. Workplace hierarchies 
are flatter and there is less room for norms that seek to preserve relationships or 
develop them beyond the limits of the printed conditions of employment (Marsden 
2004). Macneil’s  relational  values  are  squeezed  out  of  these  highly  planned   
 
arrangements of short and specified duration. 
 
If we  look  at  Macneil’s  norms  out-with private sector business relationships 
that are enforceable as legally binding contracts and in terms of more general 
exchange based relationships then the focus moves to the legacy of the New Public 
Management approach to governance of the early 1990s and the use of contract as the 
vehicle for delivering a range of state provided services and functions, including the 
construction and subsequent running of infrastructure facilities, often using private 
sector actors, to citizens. Macneil’s  stress on underlying social relations allows us to 
see these structures as forming constitutional type relationships between citizen and 
state in which procedures for monitoring service provision, incentivising performance 
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and imposing administrative sanctions are laid out (Whitford 1985; Feinman 2000). 
Empirical work of the highest quality has been carried out on these relationships by 
Peter Vincent-Jones from the 1990s onwards (2000; 2006) looking at the use of 
compulsory competitive tendering in local government and considering the use of 
contract by the state to achieve certain policy goals, such as increasing citizen choice 
or modifying citizen behaviour, in areas as diverse as the conduct of school children 
in the form of home-school agreements on homework and the delivery of welfare 
services. 
Vincent-Jones’  conclusion  is  that  measured  against  Macneil’s  norms  these 
 arrangements fall short of achieving legitimacy in terms of delivering on their policy 
objectives; there is insufficient possibility of adjustment that one might expect in an 
arrangement designed for both parties to achieve wealth-maximization, as the 
arrangements lack the inherent flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. The 
norm of reciprocity, which underpins trust, is not present because often the resources 
on the state side of the contract are insufficient to address the needs of the citizen. In 
many of the relationships, but particularly those involving social control contracts, the 
norm of consent is missing. An alternative reading of Vincent-Jones’  findings, though 
unpalatable in social policy terms, is that there was never any intention on behalf of 
the political and governance entities that use these arrangements that they should 
reflect the social norms that Macneil identifies as underpinning successful exchange 
relationships. The absence of this intention does not make these arrangements 
unsuccessful in terms of the more powerful party to the contract. While there have 
been periodic tweaks and recalibrations to the model there has not been a wholesale 
reconsideration of this methodology for service delivery by political entities nor has 
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there been revolution by citizens or ballot box rejection. What this shows instead is 
that it has been possible since Macneil first presented his model for contractual 
relationships, for these relationships, both in the legal and extra legal sense of 
contract, to exist with norms configured rather differently from the way in which they 
are explained by Macneil. The emerging picture is one that suggests that short-term 
arrangements of this type are no longer the epitome of the discrete transaction and but 
have evolved to exhibit similar relationality in terms of mutual regard to that found in 
more long-term arrangements (Davis 2007). In order to make these relationships 
sufficiently stable for public service delivery, both public sector and private sector 
actors have become learning organizations. Their learning trajectories are different 
and are related to evolving political imperatives and local context (Hartmann, Davies 
and Frederiksen 2010). 
 
 
 
III-Contracting on eBay 
 
Macneil’s  model  of  contracting  behavior  and  his  explanations  for  it  have 
 become  disrupted. What have traditionally been flexible settings have become less 
flexible, short term exchange relationships have become ones in which there is 
mutual regard between the parties while some long term relationships do not exhibit 
this. What might have been a signifier for a discrete contract might now describe the 
relational setting of a more embedded contract. The persistence of brand, for 
example, might point us to look at a series of contracts as a unified process rather as 
differently constituted unique relationships with their own constructions of 
solidarity and 
flexibility. Macneil’s  norms  can  be  re-arranged to map onto what in some cases are 
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new kinds of relationships and in others are familiar relationships that differently 
structured. What is not lost in this rearrangement is the importance of social relations. 
In  the  same  way  that  Macneil  sought  to  “relationalise”  his archetypal 
discrete contract, the purchase at the turnpike gasoline station contract, by describing 
the credit relations that accounted for the gas purchase on the turnpike and the 
supply of gas to the station and by referring to the advertising of the gas brand and 
indeed the presence of the gas station itself at that particular location on the turnpike, 
we can “relationalise”  an eBay transaction. A number of charities use eBay to sell 
off potentially collectable items that have been donated for sale at their shops and 
collection points. Courses are offered through colleges and independently for those 
who want to become successful eBay  entrepreneurs,  several  “how  to”  guides  have 
been published on eBay selling and a number of satellite business have developed, 
such as the iSold it drop off stores, selling goods on commission for others on eBay. 
However, while for the gas station example placing the transaction in a sea of other 
business relationships is the only way to make it more significant than a brief 
encounter by the side of a turnpike, this reading of eBay transactions misses the very 
much more real and personal social relations that surround each individual transaction 
in the form of the eBay feedback system. 
EBay is not involved in the delivery of goods or the sale of goods as a trading 
entity. It does not see or inspect items that are being offered for sale or extend its 
reputation to warranting them or authenticating them in any way. It is an electronic 
platform charging  sellers  to  list  their  items  and  taking  a  percentage  of  an  item’s 
 sale  price, similar to a large electronic car boot sale site or newspaper 
advertisement 
column, that acts as an intermediary to allow sellers and buyers to match their desires 
 
 
 
22 
for gain by taking part in either an auction or an immediate sale and purchase through 
online person to person trading (Mishra 2010). However instead of scanning lists of 
newspaper advertisements or rummaging through a dusty car boot while being jostled 
by other potential buyers, object location on eBay is as the result of a tailored search. 
The seller describes the item offered, often with photographs, posts an end date, a 
minimum starting bid and a bid increment. While business listings occur on eBay the 
majority of its sales in the collectables market are consumer-to-consumer transactions 
(Flanagin 2007). 
To be successful as an electronic platform eBay has to be able to accomplish 
two things at the level of technical design. It needs to be able to manage a diverse 
group of buyers and sellers in terms of having recognizable brand identity within 
which there is sufficient flexibility to accommodate a variety of interests that underlie 
participation ie eBay must be able to attract sufficient buyers for sellers to think that 
listing fees for items they are selling are worth paying and it needs to be able to offer 
reassurance that the risk involved in a one-time exchange and possibly more 
(although there is evidence that the vast majority of exchanges that take place on eBay 
are between buyers and sellers that do not deal with each other again (Resnick and 
Zeckhauser 2002) of money for an object that cannot be seen, except in a photograph, 
or touched, is as low as possible. As eBay is an intermediary that means that risk must 
be calculable and manageable by the users. The eBay system requires buyers to pay 
for their purchases before sellers dispatch them. Consequently it is upon buyers that 
the risks of moral hazard (in the form of post contractual opportunism 
such as non-dispatch of the item despite receiving payment) and information 
 
asymmetry (adverse selection due to unannounced defects) fall (Dewan and Hsu 
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2004). 
 
If we return to the earlier example of eBay being employed to source and 
purchase Beswick Beatrix Potter character figures then at any one time there are 
approximately 2500 figures on eBay that fall within the descriptive parameters of 
“Bewsick Beatrix Potter” figures ranging in starting price bids from £5 to £3999. 
Some very rare figures may be listed only once in those 2500 listings, other less rare 
figures may appear 50 times or so listed by different sellers. The question for a buyer 
is how they choose their seller in a market where there is a choice and in a market 
where there is only one seller how they decide whether to trust them or not by making 
a purchase. Engaging in exchange relations on eBay is not about the market 
reputation  of  a  particular  item  but  much  more  about  a  buyer’s  trust  in  the  seller 
 of  the  product to describe that product accurately and dispatch after receiving 
payment. In the context of Beatrix Potter figures what matters to the collector is that 
the figure is not restored but is in its original condition. A perfect figure is worth more 
than a damaged figure but a damaged figure is worth considerably more than a 
restored figure. Damage can often be seen in photographs but restoration can only be 
detected by physical inspection. Also of importance is the stamp that appears on the 
underside of  the  figure,  “the  back stamp”.  This  determines  the  age  of  the  figure 
as some thirteen different variations of back stamp were used in the fifty or so years 
that these figures were produced (Baynton, May and Morton 1986). It is not the case 
that older figures are always worth more than newer figures. Some figures were only 
made with a particular back stamp for a very short time and so are valuable for 
reasons of rarity rather than age. In the absence of a photograph, as a collector I am 
reliant on the 
description that the seller gives of the back stamp. An unscrupulous seller can provide 
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false information or feign not to understand the significance of the detail they are 
being asked to provide and so provide no information or wrong information 
(Robinson and Halle 2002). In some cases the value of a particular figure depends on 
very small design details that evolved over the years of production and distinguish 
one version of the figure from another. Beswick secured copyright permission to 
design and produce the Beatrix Potter figures in 1948. The modeller, one Arthur 
Gredington, sometimes changed the shape of a figure slightly or the colour of 
particular parts of the figures within the same back stamp. For example there are three 
versions of the Benjamin Bunny figure, all within the same back stamp, that have 
vastly different values not least because one of them was only produced for two years 
(Callow and Chorley 2008). Space does not permit me to explain in detail the stylistic 
differences between these figures but suffice to say I am reliant on the angle that the 
seller’s  photograph  is  taken  from  to  know  for  certain  whether  Benjamin’s  ears 
 protrude beyond his hat or not, in other instances I am reliant on the quality of the 
seller’s  camera  to  reproduce  accurately  the  colour  of  his  jacket. I have to trust the 
seller if I am to purchase the figure. If I cannot trust them I potentially miss an 
opportunity. 
None of the usual social cues that generate trust and confidence or wariness and 
mistrust in a face-to-face interaction are present. Nor, given the prevalence of single 
buyer-seller exchanges can trust in the seller be established through repeated 
interactions. Presentiation,  in  Macneil’s  terms, reigns and so there is no interest 
from the seller in securing co-operation from the buyer in relation to establishing a 
relationship that will be both productive and negotiable into the future. As a platform 
eBay offers users, and this primarily means buyers, as sellers are free to offer their 
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item for sale again if payment does not materialize, an opportunity to choose their 
seller using the experiences of others as a trust barometer. It does this through 
offering a feedback forum. In using this forum buyers are invited to describe in one 
word, taken from a pre-selected menu, their view of the quality of experience that the 
transaction provided; positive, negative or neutral. Sellers can only leave positive 
feedback for buyers or no feedback at all. This reflects their more immediate power in 
individual transactions. The buyer can justify their view in 80 characters and then 
rate, using a starring system, aspects of the transaction such as the accuracy of the 
item description, the speed of dispatch and the postage costs. As the seller engages in 
more sales so a reputation is built up online and can be accessed by a potential buyer 
who can then, using the information in the profile, decide on the likely honesty and 
trustworthiness of a buyer. Buyers’  power  then  is  reflected  backwards  through 
 transactions. The feedback system is being used to generate trust through a 
formalized process in which a buyer, unsure whether to trust a seller not known to 
them, is encouraged to establish trust in that buyer based on the views of other eBay 
users that are also unknown to them. It is a reputational gossip network where an 
individual buyer is substituting personal knowledge of a seller or a personal 
recommendation from someone they know who has dealt with the seller for a much 
larger volume of recommendations from strangers (Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman 
and Kuwabara 
2000; Van Swol 2006). In addition to attracting fewer potential buyers, sellers with 
persistently low scores feedback scores might find that they are suspended by eBay or 
restricted in what they can sell by eBay. What emerges from the feedback system is a 
reputation management methodology whereby both sanction power and signaling 
power can be exercised by buyers to deal with moral hazard and adverse selection 
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respectively (Dellarocas 2003). 
 
Reputation created and managed in this way is different to the social relations 
that surround reputation when single transactions are carried out offline. Online 
interactions involve leaving negative feedback where the individual who is its object, 
unlike the conveying of negative reputational information to third parties that occurs 
offline, can see it; an aggrieved buyer may not want this degree of direct exposure to 
seller even in circumstances where the identity they are presenting is their eBay 
identity rather than their offline identity. In the absence of the intention to trade in the 
future with the particular seller there is no incentive to leave feedback of any sort as 
the beneficiaries of that feedback will be unknown future traders although, in fact, it 
seems that feedback is left in around 60% of transactions (Saeedi, Shen and 
Sundaresan 2012). There is the possibility of feedback being gamed through the use 
of seller collaboration to increase positive scores or high positive feedback scores 
being sprung from a vast number of low price trades to create a misleading picture of 
reliability when a high price trade is attempted. It is straightforward for a seller to 
create an entirely new identity which, while it is not enhanced by positive feedback, 
has not been sullied by negative feedback either. Notwithstanding these concerns 
about its absolute accuracy and reliability the eBay feedback system is clearly 
considered by the users of eBay to be robust enough to allay their concerns about 
seller honesty and reliability. Not only is eBay itself an extremely successful business 
but also analysis of transactions suggests that sellers with higher feedback ratings 
achieve higher prices for their listings (Ottaway, Bruneau and Evans 2003). 
Feedback on eBay has the effect of creating social relations between strangers. 
 
In this respect it is different from other online presences such as retail stores where 
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the object is to create trust in the technology itself rather than a person (Shanker, 
Urban and Sultan 2002). Feedback provides information from one buyer to millions 
of potential buyer another about a seller they may never encounter very quickly and it 
overcomes the geographical dispersal of buyers. It provides a rich and documented 
form of support that achieves more granularity than offline reputational discussions 
are likely to do (Tambyah 1996) . The feedback system is successful in creating 
relationships of trust because it pulls on the levers of community responsibility and 
individual participation. It is a tool that empowers individuals to punish or reward a 
trading partner knowing that others will operate a sanction based on their view and 
there is an obligation on individuals to participate by leaving feedback if the system is 
to appear reliable (Heimer 2001) to the user community. The idea of relying on 
feedback appeals to the current climate of trust which appears to be placed more 
strongly by individuals in  “people  just  like  ourselves”  than  in  other groups such as 
political or business leaders (Eldeman Trust Barometer 2012, Tett 2013). The 
feedback system allows individuals to decide whom they will trust while wrapping 
their decisions into the fold of community values that they as buyers share are 
encouraged to adopt. EBay supports and encourages the idea that buyers are an online 
community (Mathwick 2002) with shared values - in its statement of “community 
 values”  eBay asserts, “people  are  basically  good”  and  extorts users to “treat  others 
 the way that you want to be treated”. 
 
 
 
IV Conclusion 
 
In  this  contribution  I  have  set  out  the  case  for  the  continuing  utility  of  Macneil’s 
  
 
relational contract theory despite the changing context of contracting behavior in a 
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world that is very different from the one described by Macneil. Advances in 
technology and changing economic patterns that impact on how contracts are made 
and how contracts are experienced need to us to reconsider the indicators that we use 
for  Macneil’s  conceptual  categories  of  relational and discrete.  These different 
contexts allow us to make a more relational assessment of situations that would 
appear on first sight to be much closer to a discrete situation. EBay trading contracts 
rely on community constructed feedback to counter information asymmetry. As 
online shopping and trading increases in popularity we may come to see social 
relations constructed to radiate beyond the contracting partners as the paradigm 
example of 21
st  
century contract relations in the same way that machinery supply in 
Wisconsin was the paradigm contract of the second half of the 20 century for those of 
us, who, following Macneil, have rejected the doctrinal model of the purely discrete 
exchange. 
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